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Abstract
In the theory of social choice the research is focused around the pro-
jection of individual preference orders to the social preference order. Also,
the justification of the preference order formalism begins with the concept
of utility i.e. an alternative is preferred to another one if the utility over
the first is higher then the utility over the second. In this paper is pro-
posed an ideal model of measuring utilities by considering individuals and
alternatives no more as atomic concepts but as being composed by other
entities.
1 Basic definitions
Individuals, along their existence, tries to reach a series of objectives that,
according to them, ensure a satisfiable individual welfare. When an indi-
vidual judges over an alternative considers his own objectives and observes
the possibility that this particular alternative will allow him to reach these
objectives.
Definition 1 Given a society V = {V1, V2, ..., VN} and an environment
A = {A1, A2, ..., AM}, we define the universe of the objectives, the set:
Γ = {γ1, γ2, ..., γR}
as the set of all the required objectives by the individuals in I and the
objectives offered by the alternatives in A.
For each alternative Am ∈ A we can put in evidence the set of the
offered objectives, that for simplicity we will give it the same name as the
alternative itself:
Am = {α
m
1 , α
m
2 , ..., α
m
H}
where αmh ∈ Γ for all h = 1, ..., H .
Similarly, each individual Vn ∈ V is characterised by the set of the required
objectives:
Vn = {ν
n
1 , ν
n
2 , ..., ν
n
K}
where νnk ∈ Γ for all k = 1, ..., K.
Considering the universe Γ as a-priori entity, we can treat a given alter-
native or individual as an element of ℘(Γ)1 The set of all the alternatives
1
℘(Γ) is the set of all subsets of Γ
1
definable over Γ is simply the following:
A∗ = {Am | Am ∈ ℘(Γ)− φ}
Similarly, the set of all individuals definable over Γ is:
V ∗ = {Vn | Vn ∈ ℘(Γ)− φ}
Definition 2 Given an environment A, we define the opportunity uni-
verse as the following set:
ΓA =
M⋃
m=1
Am
containing all the objectives offered by at least one alternative.
Definition 3 Given a society V , we define the exigence universe as the
following set:
ΓV =
N⋃
n=1
Vn
containing all the objective required by at least one individual.
We can distinguish the following subset of the universe Γ:
• ΓA − ΓV , not offered request
• ΓV − ΓA, not requested offer
• ΓA ∩ ΓV , requested offer and offered request
2 Utility measure based on the set car-
dinality
The next step is to define an utility measure. An immediate measure
may be the cardinality between the individual set of objectives and the
alternative set of objectives. We will use the notation u(Am | Vn) or
un(Am) to denote the utlity of Vn over Am.
Definition 4 Given Am ∈ A and Vn ∈ V the cardinal utility is defined
as:
cu(Am | Vn) = card(Am ∩ Vn)
This utility measure, if measurable, allows us to order alternatives in
decreasing order, but there is a problem; this measure may assume arbi-
trary values. Suppose we have two individuals such that Vp = {α} and
Vq = {α, β, γ} an suppose they have to evaluate an alternative charac-
terised by Am = {α, β, γ}. By using the cardinality measure we have
u(Am | VP ) = 1 and u(Am | Vq) = 3. Both Vp and Vq are satisfied of
the choice they have made, because Am offers all they requested, but the
utility are different, this because Vp is less exigent than Vq. If we want to
homogenise the utility measure we ha define a more specialised cardinal
utility.
Definition 5 Given Am ∈ A and Vn ∈ V , the normalised cardinal utility
is defined as:
ncu(Am | Vn) =
card(Am ∩ Vn)
card(Vn)
(1)
where ncu(Am | Vn) indicates the utility of Vn over Am.
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Let’s try to specialise further the utility measure. Individuals, in gen-
eral, do not treat their own objectives with the same importance. We
can suppose that it is assigned a weight for each of the objectives. The
individuals have to be characterised by a membership function, like in
the fuzzy sets. The classic set definition can be formulated in terms of
membership function.
GIven a set S, for all u in the universe U , the membership function
µS : U → {0, 1} of the set S is defined as follows:
• ∀u ∈ S, µS(u) = 1
• ∀u /∈ S, µS(u) = 0
Fuzzy sets are defined simply by changing the definition of the membership
function from µS : U → {0, 1} to µS : U → [0, 1]. An element u ∈ U can
belong to S with a grade of membership less than 1.
Let’s return back to our question of defining a cardinal-oriented utility
measure .
Assumption 1 Given the universe of the objectives Γ, for all individual
Vn in the society V it is defined a membership function:
µVn : U → [0, 1]
Now is possible to define a further version of the utility measure.
Definition 6 Given an individual Vn ∈ V and an alternative Am ∈ A
and supposing that the Vn is characterised by the membership function
µn : Γ → [0, 1], the fuzzy utility measure fu(Am | Vn) = fun(Am) of Vn
over Am is defined as:
fu(Am | Vn) =
∑
γ∈Am
µn(γ)∑
γ∈Γ µn(γ)
(2)
3 Evaluation Processes
Once we have a model of how individuals express the own opinions regard-
ing the alternatives, remains to define formally the voting process. Here
we will call the entire decision process of the society with the term evalu-
ation process, principally to distinguish from the classical choice process
that operates over preference orders.
Given an utility measure u(Am | Vn) = un(Am), according (1), (2)
2, for
each individual Vn, we define the individual profile as the following vector:
u
(n) =


un(A1)
un(A2)
...
un(AM )


Definition 7 An evaluation process is defined as quadruple:
E = 〈A,V, U, f〉
where:
• A = {A1, ..., AM} is a finite and non empty set of alternatives, called
environment
2The utility measure can be defined also in another way, independently to the formalism
proposed here.
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• V = {V1, ..., VN} is a finite and non empty set of individuals, called
society
• U = {u1, ...,uN} is a set of individual profiles, where un is the profile
of Vn.
• f : [0, 1]N → [0, 1] is a function, called evaluation function, that
returns a corresponding social profile, given the individual profiles.
The evaluation function is not the same as the social welfare function; the
second return the social preference order, given the individual preference
orders, while the evaluation function operates over vectors in RM .
Evaluation processes are characterised by the nature of the evaluation
function. An immediate example of evaluation function is the mean of
individual profiles. Given an environment A = {A1, ..., AM} and a society
V = {V1, ..., VN} the mean social profile is defined as the following vector
in RM
u =
1
N
N∑
n=1
u
n
.
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